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deal with damages. Perhaps in later cases some acceptable guidelines will be established.
There is an inconsistency in recognizing a wrong but not providing a remedy. It has been suggested that living with this dilemma
will do less harm to society than providing a solution in the courts.
18 STAN. L. BEv. 530 (1966). Nevertheless, the court in the
principal case seems to have provided a realistic remedy in that
particular factual situation.
David Ray Rexroad

Torts-Unavoidable Accident
P was a passenger in an automobile driven by his brother which
was involved in a collision with an automobile driven by D.
Evidence indicated that both automobiles entered an intersection
on a green light. P brought an action against D for personal injuries.
The trial court entered a "take nothing" judgment. Held, affirmed.
The evidence, including testimony that both drivers properly entered the intersection on a green light, supported a jury finding
that neither driver was negligent and justified giving an instruction concerning unavoidable accident. Boiling v. Clay, 144 S.E.2d
682 (W. Va. 1965).
The question of when an instruction of unavoidable accident is
proper in this jurisdiction is one that has not been easy to answer
in the past. The court in the principal case has taken a step toward
clarifying the position of West Virginia in an area which has been
frustrating and confusing to the most experienced lawyer. An
unavoidable accident as defined by the court in the principal case,
"is one which occurs while all persons concerned are exercising
ordinary care, that is, one not caused by the fault of any of the
persons; if the accident producing the injury could have been prevented by either person by means suggested by common prudence
it is not deemed unavoidable." The principal case, Boiling v. Clay,
supra at 688.
There is much confusion as to when an instruction concerning
an unavoidable accident may be given. In the majority of jurisdictions, the basic rules applicable to instructions apply. Most
jurisdictions require that there be evidence in the record which
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would support a finding that an occurrence complained of was of
the nature indicated by the instruction, and it must be shown by
the record that the jury would be justified in finding that there
was no negligence on the part of either the plaintiff or the
defendant. See, e.g., Rowton v. Kempi, 190 Okla. 558, 125 P.2d 103
(19421).
The majority of jurisdictions justify the instruction by the need
to call to the jury's attention the fact that they are under no obligation to find that someone was at fault and must respond in damages.
Jurors may need to be reminded that accidents sometimes happen
through the fault of no one and that not all accidents are caused
by negligence. Schapiro v. Meyers, 160 Md. 208, 153 At. 27 (1931);
Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449 (1941).
In a substantial number of jurisdictions, the courts will refuse
an instruction on unavoidable accident. Several important issues
are raised by refusing the instruction. Perhaps the leading case
on this question is Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 652,
320 P.2d 500 (1958), in which the court did not allow the instruction
and declared that since it merely restates a feature of the law of
negligence which in substance is necessarily covered by proper
instructions on negligence, burden of proof and proximate cause,
it is not needed. It was submitted that the instruction served no
useful purpose, operated to over-emphasize the defendant's case and
was apt to confuse and mislead the jury.
In the ordinary negligence case the plaintiff must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent
and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
Since an unavoidable accident is simply an accident in which the
defendant was not negligent, it may be argued that adequate instructions on negligence, proximate cause and the respective
burdens of proof should fully inform the jury of the law in regard
to any accident which was unavoidable. A separate instruction concerning unavoidable accident might tend to confuse the jury. Such
an instruction is merely a repetition of the defendant's argument of
non-liability which should not be permitted by the court. This
is the position of the minority of jurisdictions. Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d
12 (1959).
Another objection concerns the question of the burden of proof
when unavoidable accident is used as an affirmative defense. Some
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courts state that if the defendant pleads an unavoidable accident,
he has the burden of showing that everything was done within
human power to avoid the accident. See, e.g., Tyree v. Dunn,
315 P.2d 782 (Okla. 1957). The objection to this rests on a fundamental legal concept. In an action to recover damages for negligence, the burden of proving the defendant's negligence rests with
the plaintiff. Kay v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 163 N.Y. 447, 57 N.E.
751 (1900).
If a defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff but sets up
new facts as a defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
sustain his defense. This type of defense is commonly known as
"confession and avoidance." However, a plea of unavoidable accident would appear not to admit the facts alleged by the plaintiff
but in essence to deny negligence since an unavoidable accident
is one that occurs through the negligence of neither party.
West Virginia has recognized a distinction as to the "burden of
proof" when the plaintiff has established a prima facie case against
the defendant. In a recent case, Lester v. Flanagan,145 W. Va. 166,
113 S.E.2d 87 (1960), the West Virginia court stated that the term
"burden of proof' has two distinct meanings which should not be
confused. The obligation is on the plaintiff throughout the trial
to establish proof of his allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence. This burden to persuade never shifts. However, the term
"burden of proof' may denote the obligation devolving on the
defendant, and perhaps passing from one party to the other as the
case progresses, to meet a prima facie case made by the other party.
The latter meaning is perhaps more accurately symbolized as the
necessity of going forward with the evidence or the burden to
produce.
Recognizing this distinction, a problem arises where the plaintiff
has not established a prima facie case of negligence. Must the
defendant still prove himself free from negligence? If so, this would
violate the basic principle that in a negligence case the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant.
This would involve an actual shift of the burden to persuade.
Going one step further, if it rests on the defendant to establish
facts showing an unavoidable accident, must the defendant prove
that the plaintiff also was free from negligence? This would appear
to be necessary if unavoidable accident is regarded as an affirmative
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defense, as the defendant has the burden of proving all issues
raised as a matter of affirmative defense. Pittmanv. Downing, 209
N.C. 219, 183 S.E. 362 (1936).
In the principal case, the evidence clearly showed that the jury
would be justified in finding that there was no negligence on the
part of either the plaintiff or defendant. The court approved the
giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident. Although the
court did not go into a detailed discussion of the issues outlined
above, it seems that West Virginia is in accord with the majority of
jurisdictions.
William Jack Stevens
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